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CYBERSQUATTING: THE LATEST CHALLENGE IN FEDERAL
TRADEMARK PROTECTION
¶ 1          The explosion in Internet technology in the past decade has drawn the Lanham Act into
the realm of electronic commerce. Trademark owners seeking to register domain names have
recently found themselves entwined in a number of disputes, such as disputes involving claims
to multiple domain names and disputes over whether the domain name registration system is
fairly administered. One important legal issue that has recently come to the fore is over the
practice of cybersquatting. Today, courts must contend with the cybersquatter, a speculator who
reserves trademarks as Internet domain names for the sole purpose of selling or licensing them
back to trademark owners willing to pay a considerable price for their use. Complicating
matters, the most potent weapons in the Government's anticybersquatting arsenal--the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) and Federal Trademark Dilution Act
(FTDA)--each give rise to grave constitutional concerns.
¶ 2          This iBrief traces the evolution of legal remedies to cybersquatting. It first provides a
summary critique of cases predating the recently enacted ACPA. Second, this iBrief thoroughly
discusses the ACPA and how it has been construed. Lastly, this iBrief explores constitutional
issues related to cybersquatting, analyzing the current regime and the features that cast doubt on
its legitimacy.
Cybersquatting Under the Lanham Act
¶ 3          Cybersquatting is about beating the trademark holder to a domain name. For example,
if a person registers the domain name "pepsi.com" in hopes that Pepsi Co. will later buy the
domain name from her, she is cybersquatting. Since domain names are registered to only one
person or entity at a time (although multiple domain names may point to the same website), the
trademark holder's options are limited: pay or litigate.
¶ 4          Cybersquatting cases predating the ACPA demonstrate that the Lanham Act's 
trademark infringement and dilution provisions are ill-equipped to corral the ever-swelling ranks 
of cybersquatters. Consumer confusion as to the source of goods, the touchstone of trademark 
infringement,1 is rare in cybersquatting cases. The cybersquatter usually forgoes commercial use
of the domain name, electing not to offer through his web site any goods or services that would
lead consumers to believe that such goods and services have their source or sponsorship in the
trademark owner's establishment.2 Instead, the cybersquatter merely reserves the domain name
for the purpose of selling it back to the trademark holder at a profit. Thus, regardless of the
strength of the trademark holder's mark, the mark's similarity to the cybersquatter's domain
name, and the cybersquatter's intent--all factors that normally weigh in favor of a finding of
consumer confusion--3 a trademark infringement claim against a cybersquatter will generally be
defeated.
¶ 5          The Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA),4 a subsection of the Lanham Act, has
also struggled to keep cybersquatters in check. The FTDA eliminates the "likelihood of
confusion" requirement of trademark infringement.5 As with trademark infringement, however,
a court deciding dilution may not enjoin the use of a registered domain name unless the
cybersquatter has used the domain name in commerce.6 Thus, a cybersquatter who merely holds
a domain name cannot normally be held liable for trademark dilution.
¶ 6          Courts have nonetheless found cybersquatting to be a form of trademark dilution in
cases like Intermatic7 and Panavision.8 These cases have drawn much criticism. In each case the
cybersquatter was not using the domain name as a trademark qua trademark, i.e., for the bona
fide purpose of identifying the source or sponsorship of goods and services circulating in the
ordinary course of trade, but rather for extortionate ends.9 As discussed, the Lanham Act does
not bestow an absolute property right in the mark: trademark protection forbids only commercial
uses of a mark tending to dilute or engender confusion in the marketplace.10 As the
cybersquatting in these two cases did not involve commercial use, it normally would not permit
a finding of trademark dilution or infringement. Noting this, one commentator suggested (rather
prophetically) that the answer to cybersquatting lay by analogy in state unfair competition laws
providing in rem11 proceedings against corporate names registered with the "fraudulent purpose
of pirating the business of the corporation or with actual knowledge of the existence and name of
the foreign corporation."12
¶ 7          Lest the reader be left with the misimpression that trademark infringement and dilution 
are impotent against cybersquatters, both doctrines are still very much alive in cyberspace. 
Where A has registered and commercially used "drpepper.com" to sell competing soft drink 
products, and consumer confusion (or a substantial potential therefor) results, A may be liable 
for both trademark dilution and trademark infringement. The shortcoming of these two causes of 
action is that they may be insufficient to deal with the many cybersquatters who do not actually
use domain names in commerce.
The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
¶ 8          The Lanham Act's perceived inadequacies in dealing with cybersquatting prompted
Congress to observe that, as cybersquatters become more adept at avoiding liability, trademark
holders will be "without adequate and effective judicial remedies."13 Answering the call, the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) provides "clarity in the law for trademark
owners by prohibiting the bad-faith and abusive registration of distinctive marks as Internet
domain names with the intent to profit from the goodwill associated with such marks."14
¶ 9          Under the ACPA, a cause of action for cybersquatting lies where: (1) plaintiff's mark is
"distinctive" or "famous" at the time of registration of the domain name; (2) the cybersquatter's
domain name is (a) identical or confusingly similar to a distinctive mark, or (b) identical,
confusingly similar to, or dilutive of a famous mark; and (3) the cybersquatter acted with a "bad
faith intent to profit" from the mark.15 What is most striking about this statute is that it does not
condition a cause of action on trademark infringement or dilution; it is enough that the domain
name be identical or confusingly similar in appearance to a distinctive trademark. Further, unlike
the FTDA, the ACPA does not require that a mark be famous to receive protection against
dilution.16 No less important, the ACPA does not require formal commercial use of the
trademark-domain name, but instead targets cybersquatters who merely register domain names,
as well as cybersquatters who traffic in (i.e., sell, purchase, loan, pledge, license)17 or otherwise
use domain names.18 By proscribing the bad faith registration of domain names, the ACPA
prevents cybersquatters from exploiting the settlement value of cases against trademark holders
wishing to avoid the expense of litigation.19
¶ 10          At this writing, Sporty's Farm v. Sportsman's Mkt. is the only case to interpret the
ACPA at the federal appellate level. Consistent with the structure of the ACPA, Sporty's directs
that a court must first determine whether a mark is "distinctive" or "famous" by weighing the
non-exclusive criteria enumerated in the FTDA for assaying trademark dilution.20 In this
connection, the Sporty's court noted that distinctiveness and fame are separate concepts.21 A
mark may be distinctive because of its inherent qualities, but not famous. Conversely, a
non-distinctive mark may become famous by virtue of acquiring secondary meaning.
¶ 11          Second, a court must decide if the domain name and trademark at issue are identical, 
confusingly similar and/or dilutive.22 When examining a domain name, the court need not 
consider slight differences in punctuation, spacing or capitalization, because the strict format of
domain names does not accommodate such stylistic variations.23 Accordingly, "sporty's" and
"sportys.com" were adjudged confusingly similar for the purpose of assessing liability under the
ACPA.24 Sporty's further noted that confusing similarity under the ACPA is not measured by
the Polaroid factors applied in trademark infringement cases.25 To hold otherwise would
effectively import trademark infringement as an added condition of a civil action under the
ACPA. Also, by not articulating a test for determining confusing similarity, the court left the
matter open for lower courts to decide.26 It is a reasonable inference from the Sporty's decision,
however, that between infringing marks under n 32 and 43 of the Lanham Act and confusingly
similar marks under the ACPA, the latter focuses exclusively on the similar appearance of the
marks in question, merely one of several Polaroid factors.27
¶ 12          Third, a court must determine whether the cybersquatter acted with a "bad faith intent
to profit" from use of the trademark holder's mark.28 A cybersquatter may escape liability if he
can show that he "believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain
name was a fair use or otherwise lawful."29 In Shields v. Zuccarini, for instance, the defendant
insisted that he had registered the domain name in question with the legitimate expectation of
establishing an Internet site for protesting plaintiff's gruesome cartoon depictions of brutality to
animals.30 The court rejected defendant's argument that he intended to use the domain names for
political speech, noting that he had registered thousands of domain names confusingly similar to
other famous marks for the obvious purpose of diverting Internet traffic to his own sites, that he
had altered the content of his site only after the suit was filed against him, and that he had
registered numerous other sites promoting activities he now claimed to be protesting.31
¶ 13          If the three foregoing elements of the ACPA are satisfied, a court may order general 
injunctive relief, including the forfeiture, cancellation or transfer of the domain name to the 
trademark owner, even if the domain name was registered prior to the enactment of the ACPA.32 
On this point, the Sporty's court reasoned that, consistent with the US Supreme Court's decision 
in Landgraf v. USI Film,33 injunctive relief respecting domain names registered prior to the 
enactment of the ACPA is not impermissibly retroactive because such relief prevents continuing 
future harm from the use of such domain names.34 The trademark holder may also recover 
monetary damages, but only for domain names registered after the date of enactment--35 a policy 
that arguably offers inadequate compensation to certain trademark holders whose marks are 
registered by a cybersquatter prior to the ACPA. For example, in Sporty's, the court affirmed the 
grant of injunctive relief against Sporty's Farm, but was unable to award damages because 
"sportys.com" was registered prior to the enactment of the ACPA.36 However, the court held 
that the ACPA does not preclude recovery of damages under pre-existing law, including the
trademark infringement and dilution provisions of the Lanham Act.37 In other words, the ACPA
does not remove the doctrines of trademark infringement and dilution as available remedies.
¶ 14          In brief, if an offending domain name is commercially used to identify products and
services in commerce, the doctrines of trademark dilution and infringement will apply.
Otherwise, the ACPA governs use of the domain name and will interdict only those domain
names registered in bad faith, regardless of whether the domain name tends to dilute or create
confusion as to the source or sponsorship of the corresponding trademark.
Constitutional Concerns
¶ 15          As noted, the Lanham Act (including the FTDA) and the ACPA raise grave
constitutional concerns. Some critics assert that the Lanham Act and ACPA are prior restraints
on speech protected under the First Amendment. Others assert that a trademark owner should
not be able to use intellectual property rights to exclude others from markets that the trademark
owner has not chosen to exploit. Finally, there are policy concerns about the fairness of existing
approaches to cybersquatting.
Freedom of Speech
¶ 16          At bottom, the Lanham Act is a prior restraint on commercial speech. Trademarks are
commercial speech insofar as they propose commercial transactions; to wit, they convey
messages about the origin and quality of goods and services for the purpose of influencing
consumer spending.38 Although Congress' power to regulate commercial transactions implies a
"concomitant power to regulate commercial speech that is 'inextricably linked' to those
transactions,"39 Congress retains less regulatory authority where the restriction "strikes at 'the
substance of the information communicated' rather than the 'commercial aspect of it.'"40 The
commercial speech doctrine thus represents an accommodation between the right to speak and
hear about goods and services and the right of government to regulate the sales of such goods
and services.41 Where the restriction "entirely prohibits" truthful and nonmisleading commercial
speech for reasons unrelated to the fair bargaining process, a court applying heightened scrutiny
must determine whether regulation advances its asserted interest to a material degree42 and in a
manner that is no more extensive than necessary.43
¶ 17          To the extent the Lanham Act forecloses misleading or untruthful commercial 
communications involving trademarks, it is consonant with First Amendment jurisprudence. By 
labeling trademarks as commercial speech, however, courts also allow their non-commercial
aspects to be regulated, thus suppressing noncommercial, nonmisleading expression and ideas
that are ordinarily entitled to full protection.44 For example, domain names are sometimes used
by their owners to express artistic, political, or social statements through parody of that mark.45
Further, inasmuch as offensive or indecent speech, as distinct from obscene speech, is protected
under the First Amendment,46 domain names that dilute by virtue of their foulness or
offensiveness may be protected speech as well.
¶ 18          Moreover, it is argued that decisions under the Lanham Act that regulate the content
of speech,47 as opposed to the mere time, place or manner in which the speech can be
delivered,48 should be reviewed by courts under the heightened scrutiny standard applied to
noncommercial speech. Under this view, the expressive elements of domain names justify full
First Amendment protection against blanket prohibitions on all misleading commercial speech.49
With anti-dilution in particular, the argument goes, regulation of offensive names is unnecessary
because market forces will eliminate domain names the public finds offensive, thus preserving
the marketplace of ideas.50
¶ 19          The absence of a commercial use requirement in the ACPA similarly heightens the
risk of suppressing constitutionally protected speech.51 In theory, the bad faith requirement of
the ACPA protects persons who use their domain names for legitimate purposes, including
political, religious, or artistic expression sacrosanct under the First Amendment. In practice,
however, courts solicitous of trademark holders may be inclined to construe bad faith where it is
not.52 As one commentator noted, "the cybersquatting precedents are already being used by
trademark owners to take domain names away from arguably legitimate users, such as people
who want to register their last names as Internet domains and those who build a gripe site to
complain about a specific product or company."53
Intellectual Property Rights
¶ 20          It is also debated whether the right of trademark should effectively clear the way for 
trademark owners to prevent others from commercially exploiting the mark in markets 
(electronic or otherwise) the owner has yet to enter. Should the right of trademark sweep within 
its zone of protection markets and media of expression yet to be exploited? In the realm of 
brick-and-mortar commerce, a private corporation wishing to build a shopping center on your 
land must persuade you to sell; otherwise, no shopping center. In the realm of eCommerce, by 
contrast, a private corporation wishing to use your registered domain name can take it from you 
without compensation. And what of markets or modes of communication yet to be established or
discovered? Does the Nike corporation, for example, reserve the exclusive right to "Nike" in
say, virtual reality, if and when it becomes a viable marketing tool? In a similar and not too
far-fetched vein, is the Nike corporation currently entitled to exclusive use of the Nike swoosh in
interplanetary commerce a hundred or more years from now?
¶ 21          To a degree, trademark owners enjoy the right to exclusive commercial use in markets
they have yet to exploit. The trademark is a comparatively weak property right, however, limited
to protection against harmful commercial uses by third parties.54 Thus, until the trademark
holder commercially enters the field, there is no risk of infringement or dilution, and hence no
reason to enjoin third-party use of the mark. Nevertheless, the trademark owner is afforded a
protective zone of natural market expansion against "the use of [his] mark on any product or
service which [at the time of the intervening user's appearance] would reasonably be thought by
the buying public to come from the same source, or thought to be affiliated with, connected
with, or sponsored by, the trademark owner."55 Indeed, in assessing the potential for consumer
confusion, courts consider the likelihood of the plaintiff entering the defendant's market--one of
the classic Polaroid factors.56
¶ 22          The ACPA takes a position less friendly to trademark owners. Rather than reserve to
the trademark owner an absolute preemptive right to claim domain names that fall within his
natural zone of expansion, the ACPA merely interdicts the registration and use of domain names
with intent to trade on the goodwill of similar and confusingly similar trademarks. By allowing
any person acting in good faith and with full knowledge of prior trademark use to register or sell
that mark as a domain name, even where consumers naturally expect the domain to belong to the
trademark owner, Congress has made it considerably easier to exploit the Internet in advance of
trademark holders. The ACPA, then, perceives an unfairness in ordering a domain name owner,
who has registered, sold, licensed, or otherwise managed his domain names in good faith, to
surrender his domain name to a covetous trademark owner. Accordingly, under the ACPA,
anyone may register and traffic in a domain name, trademark or not, and if so however popular,
for reasons other than wanting to exploit the mark's goodwill. This holds true even if the domain
name causes dilution of a corresponding trademark or consumer confusion as to the domain
name's source or sponsorship. This accommodation of the ACPA undoubtedly favors the
property and free speech interests of good faith domain name owners over the interests of
trademark holders seeking unobstructed expansion into eCommerce.
Policy Considerations
¶ 23          It remains to be seen whether persons who register and traffic in domain names for
the express purpose of trading on the goodwill of trademarks should be enjoined (and perhaps
punished) as matter of sound public policy. To be sure, cybersquatting--whether for ransom,
poaching another's goodwill or merely to hinder another's use of the domain name--can be
harmful. The costs to the trademark holder may be quite severe: consumers weary of searching
for the trademark owner's web page will either give up in frustration, choose competing web
sites, resort to non-Internet means to acquire the desired products, or, if they finally manage to
find the web site, be so peeved that they refuse to purchase out of spite.57 Furthermore, while
blackmail may serve a beneficial moral enforcement function in some contexts, the brand of
commercial blackmail employed by most cyberpirates has no socially redeeming value.58
¶ 24          In addition to the aforementioned risk of suppressing constitutionally protected
speech, there is a compelling disparate treatment argument that favors limiting protections
against cybersquatting. Despite a growing consensus that a democratic international governing
body is vital to the effective and efficient functioning of the Internet, some still insist the Internet
should remain a "cooperative association with no centralized control" by any individual or
government agency.59 While not essential, the absence of government control would make it
substantially easier for the cybersquatter to reprise the role of the erstwhile frontiersman who
shrewdly stakes his claim to unsettled territory with an eye to lawfully arbitraging it to the first
railroad company to pass his way. It is curious indeed that cybersquatters are singled out among
legions of arbitrageurs who continue to ply their trades with minimal constraint in the realm of
real property. As property speculation has long kept the wheels of commerce turning at a steady
clip, one wonders why it should be any different with trademarks in eCommerce.
¶ 25          The rebuttal to the disparate treatment argument is that under certain circumstances
the ACPA does permit the arbitrage of domain names. Importantly, the ACPA applies only to
trademarks that were distinctive at the time of registration of the identical or confusingly similar
domain name.60 Thus, a cyberpirate may lawfully trade on the goodwill of a mark that becomes
distinctive subsequent to registration of an identical or confusingly similar domain name.61 For
example, if the domain name "ihop.com" is registered prior to International House of Pancakes'
trademarks becoming famous by acquiring secondary meaning, the owner could lawfully sell,
license, or loan ihop.com. to International House of Pancakes.
¶ 26          As the foregoing indicates, trademarks are proactive but not retroactive. As discussed 
earlier, the trademark owner enjoys advance protection against commercial use of his mark 
within a zone of natural market expansion, but a mark not distinctive at the time of registration
of a corresponding domain name does not entitle its owner to expropriate the domain name once
the mark becomes distinctive. This principle of non-retroactivity is reflected in the Lanham Act's
concurrent registration provision, under which a prior geographically remote user may continue
commercial use of a trademark even though another person has registered that mark, provided
the prior use was made in good faith,62 i.e., without actual or constructive knowledge of the
registrant's use or intent to use the mark.63 Likewise, since the ACPA applies only to trademarks
that are distinctive at the time a corresponding domain name is registered, the fact that the
domain name was registered in good faith prior to the corresponding trademark (distinctive or
not) forecloses the right of the trademark holder to claim the domain name.64 That this is so
further evinces Congress' intent to accommodate exploitation of the Internet by domain name
holders against trademark owners.
A Peek Into The Future
¶ 27          The paucity of cases interpreting the ACPA as of this writing means that there is no
easy prognosis. Whatever can be said about the ACPA, its enactment could be construed as
Congress' latest step in the direction of trademarks conceived as absolute property rights.
Section 1125 of the Lanham Act marks an unmistakable evolution from conceptualizing
trademarks as mere rights against commercial uses tending to cause consumer confusion, to
rights against dilution in the absence of confusion or direct competition between the parties in
suit, to rights against cybersquatting in the absence of confusion, direct competition, dilution,
and commercial use of the mark. Arguably, Congress is steadily stripping away the
time-honored requirements of trademark protection, effectively expanding such protection in a
manner consistent with popular notions of trademarks as real property. The ACPA may
represent but a small step in the direction of trademarks conceived as real property. This
possibility is suggested by the fact that trademark owners under the ACPA enjoy a right to
exploit their marks in cyberspace. The right is far from absolute: the ACPA's prohibitions are
directed exclusively toward predatory uses of established trademarks. Domain names that
predate trademarks and domain names employed in good faith still rest safely beyond the
preemptive grasp of trademark owners. Nonetheless, it may be that the enactment of the ACPA
shows a strengthening of trademark protection that will continue in the future. If so, elimination
of the ACPA's bad faith requirement, given its difficulty of proof and function as the last toehold
for confusingly similar and dilutive domain names, would not come as too great a surprise.
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